{"product_id":"9781461370970","title":"Theory and Decision Library C","description":"\u003ch1\u003eTheory and Decision Library C\u003c\/h1\u003e \u003ch2\u003eSuijs, Jeroen\u003c\/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn cooperative games, one generally assumes that the agents  know exactly the joint (monetary) gains that can be achieved by any  possible coalition of cooperating agents. In reality, however, only  little is known with certainty. This does not necessarily imply that  traditional cooperative game theory cannot be applied in practical  situations, for in various cases knowledge of the expected gains  suffices. In many other cases, however, it is just the sharing of risk  that is beneficial. Joint ventures, for instance, exist since  cooperation reduces the risk of the investment for the individual  parties. Since the existing models fail to incorporate such risks,  they are not suitable for analyzing cooperative decision-making under  risk. This book aims to rectify this deficiency by discussing a model  of cooperative games with random payoffs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003ch3\u003eDetails\u003c\/h3\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublished by: Springer\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublication Date: 2012-10-11\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFormat: Paperback\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eISBN-13: 9781461370970\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDOI: 10.1007\/978-1-4615-4637-5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDimensions: 235cm x155cm\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePages: 140\u003c\/p\u003e ","brand":"Springer US","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":44359097843852,"sku":"9781461370970","price":98.99,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0710\/9545\/1788\/files\/9781461370970.jpg?v=1770782729","url":"https:\/\/lateknightbooks.com\/products\/9781461370970","provider":"Late Knight Books and Services, LLC","version":"1.0","type":"link"}