This book explores Britain's relationship with Iraq between 1958 and 2003, culminating in the decision to go to war in 2003, one of the most controversial decisions taken by a post-Second World War British government. It examines why decisions over war and peace were made, how they were taken, and Britain's role in the invasion, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq between March 2003 and July 2004. The book looks back at Britain's historic role in the Middle East and traces its relationship with Iraq from the 1958 revolution onwards. Particular attention is given to Britain's role in confronting and containing Iraq between 1990 and 2003. During this period, Iraq and the Persian Gulf provided an arena in which the UK could demonstrate its continued claim to great-power status. Britain's imperial history in the region played a critical role in shaping policymakers' understanding of both the Middle East and Britain's place within it. The book also shows that policymakers across successive governments of both major political parties shared a desire to demonstrate Britain's continued relevance and influence in international politics and security. It argues that influence was often pursued as an end in itself rather than as a means of advancing a clearly defined set of British national interests. Finally, the book challenges the widely held assumption that the UK was drawn into the Iraq War by the United States, arguing instead that British policymakers made a conscious choice to become involved.

Luke Middup is a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St Andrews, UK, with a focus on military history and civil-military relations. He holds a BA in European Politics, MA in International Relations and PhD in Politics and International Relations, all from the University of Nottingham. His latest publication is The Powell Doctrine and US Foreign Policy (2016).