This book offers a concise and rigorous overview of how economic forces shape contemporary media industries. Bringing together influential contributions by Jean J. Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel, and Nathalie Sonnac, this book examines the strategic interactions between media firms, audiences, and advertisers through the lens of microeconomic theory. Using models of spatial competition, two‑sided markets, and game‑theoretic equilibria, the authors show how content choices, pricing strategies, and advertising incentives jointly determine media outcomes.

Across its chapters, this book explains why newspapers often converge toward centrist or homogenized political content, how advertising may or may not reduce prices for readers, and why competition in broadcasting depends not only on scheduling but also on the identity of presenters. It challenges the idea that market forces inevitably drive smaller newspapers out, offering conditions under which pluralism can persist. It also presents a striking insight: media bias can move in the opposite direction of readers’ preferences as a result of strategic positioning under competition.

Clear, analytical, and theoretically innovative, this book provides an essential framework for understanding media markets and the economic mechanisms that shape information, diversity, and public debate in modern societies.