Before We Decide provides a comprehensive psychological and neuroscientific analysis of the readiness potential and pre-decisional processes underlying voluntary action. Since the landmark studies by Benjamin Libet in the 1980s, the readiness potential—a slow cortical shift preceding self-initiated movement—has stood at the centre of debates about consciousness, volition, and the causal efficacy of mental states. This monograph examines both conscious and unconscious pre-decisional processes, developing a phenomenologically informed framework that distinguishes passive volitional events (desires, urges, impulses) from active volitional events (deliberate choices between conflicting reasons). Through detailed analysis of the Libet experiments and subsequent studies by Haggard and Eimer, Herrmann, Lau, and Rigoni, the book clarifies what neuroscientific findings can and cannot tell us about the relationship between neural preparation, conscious intention, and action.

The topic is of particular importance at this time because the Libet experiments continue to be cited across disciplines—from neuroscience and psychology to law, ethics, and public discourse—as bearing directly on questions of human agency and responsibility. Yet the philosophical interpretation of these findings remains contested, and recent experimental work has revealed unexpected complexities: significant variability in the timing of neural and mental events, the veto phenomenon demonstrating conscious modulation of unconsciously initiated impulses, evidence that the readiness potential reflects unspecific motor preparation rather than specific intention, and findings that cognitive attitudes toward free will influence the readiness potential itself. This book synthesises these developments and offers the most thorough analysis available of what the neuroscience of volition actually demonstrates.

Researchers and advanced students in philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and psychology will find this volume essential reading for understanding the current state of empirical research on voluntary action and its philosophical implications. The book combines rigorous engagement with primary neuroscientific literature with careful phenomenological analysis, making it valuable both for philosophers seeking to understand the experimental evidence and for neuroscientists interested in the conceptual foundations of their field. Legal scholars and ethicists concerned with the implications of neuroscience for responsibility and agency will also find the book’s measured assessment of the evidence directly relevant to their work.

Prof. Alexander Batthyány, PhD, holds the Chair of the Research Institute for Theoretical Psychology and Personalist Studies at Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Budapest, Hungary. Since 2012, Batthyány is Visiting Professor for Existential Psychotherapy at the Moscow University Institute of Psychoanalysis, Russia. He is Director of the Viktor Frankl Institute and first editor of the 14-volume edition of the Collected Works of Viktor Frankl.