{"product_id":"9783319186719","title":"SpringerBriefs in Operations Management","description":"\u003ch1\u003eSpringerBriefs in Operations Management\u003c\/h1\u003e \u003ch2\u003eZeng, Shuo; Dror, Moshe\u003c\/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis book examines contractual options for a performance based contract between an owner of a revenue generating unit and a repair agent for such unit. The framework of the analysis is that of economists' principal-agent problem. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal, the authors identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer together with the agent's optimal service capacity response. In essence, the book provides an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. Ultimately a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003ch3\u003eDetails\u003c\/h3\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublished by: Springer\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublication Date: 2015-07-14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFormat: Paperback\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eISBN-13: 9783319186719\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDOI: 10.1007\/978-3-319-18672-6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDimensions: 235cm x155cm\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePages: 129\u003c\/p\u003e ","brand":"Springer International Publishing","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":47412213743756,"sku":"9783319186719","price":49.49,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0710\/9545\/1788\/files\/9783319186719.jpg?v=1775843579","url":"https:\/\/lateknightbooks.com\/products\/9783319186719","provider":"Late Knight Books and Services, LLC","version":"1.0","type":"link"}