{"product_id":"9783642358210","title":"Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems","description":"\u003ch1\u003eLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems\u003c\/h1\u003e \u003ch2\u003eÇetiner, Demet\u003c\/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003ch3\u003eDetails\u003c\/h3\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublished by: Springer\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePublication Date: 2013-04-13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFormat: Paperback\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eISBN-13: 9783642358210\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDOI: 10.1007\/978-3-642-35822-7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDimensions: 235cm x155cm\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePages: 168\u003c\/p\u003e ","brand":"Springer Berlin Heidelberg","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":45378867232908,"sku":"9783642358210","price":49.49,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0710\/9545\/1788\/files\/9783642358210.jpg?v=1774028708","url":"https:\/\/lateknightbooks.com\/products\/9783642358210","provider":"Late Knight Books and Services, LLC","version":"1.0","type":"link"}