Successful large-scale privatization programs for highly political resources such as land require the consideration not only of economic but also of ethical aspects. On the basis of a game-theoretic framework of analysis, Jocelyn Braun shows that the mechanism of auctioning is an efficient and equitable alternative to many privatization methods that have so far been implemented with disappointing results. The author presents a solution concept and - using Bayesian mechanism design - expands the current theoretical and practice-oriented literature in the light of transformation.

Dr. Jocelyn Braun war wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Brandes am Institut für Agrarökonomie der Georg-August Universität in Göttingen. Seit 1996 ist sie Lehrbeauftragte am Lehrstuhl von Prof. Dr. Rainer Stöttner, Fachgebiet Finanzierung, Banken, Versicherung, an der Universität GH Kassel.